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We investigated how adult aging specifically alters economic decision-making, focusing
on examining alterations in uncertainty preferences (willingness to gamble) and choice
strategies (what gamble information influences choices) within both the gains and losses
domains. Within each domain, participants chose between certain monetary outcomes
and gambles with uncertain outcomes. We examined preferences by quantifying how
uncertainty modulates choice behavior as if altering the subjective valuation of gambles.
We explored age-related preferences for two types of uncertainty, risk, and ambiguity.
Additionally, we explored how aging may alter what information participants utilize to
make their choices by comparing the relative utilization of maximizing and satisficing
information types through a choice strategy metric. Maximizing information was the ratio
of the expected value of the two options, while satisficing information was the probability
of winning. We found age-related alterations of economic preferences within the losses
domain, but no alterations within the gains domain. Older adults (OA; 61–80 years old)
were significantly more uncertainty averse for both risky and ambiguous choices. OA
also exhibited choice strategies with decreased use of maximizing information. Within
OA, we found a significant correlation between risk preferences and choice strategy.
This linkage between preferences and strategy appears to derive from a convergence
to risk neutrality driven by greater use of the effortful maximizing strategy. As utility
maximization and value maximization intersect at risk neutrality, this result suggests
that OA are exhibiting a relationship between enhanced rationality and enhanced value
maximization. While there was variability in economic decision-making measures within
OA, these individual differences were unrelated to variability within examined measures
of cognitive ability. Our results demonstrate that aging alters economic decision-making
for losses through changes in both individual preferences and the strategies individuals
employ.
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Introduction
Aging has been suggested to result in alterations in numerous
cognitive processes, but it is unclear what speciﬁc alterations in
economic decision making may take place. Understanding age-
related alterations of economic decision-making is important,
as elderly persons are often less ﬁnancially resilient and often
considered more likely to be targets of consumer fraud (Lee and
Soberon-Ferrer, 1997; Castle et al., 2012; Ross et al., 2014). In this
study, we speciﬁcally test whether economic decision making is
altered in a healthy sample of older adults (OA), through tasks
that control for dissociable processes (such as learning ormemory
eﬀects).
At the most general cognitive levels, aging is associated with
decreased processing speed (Salthouse, 2000) and deﬁcits in a
range of cognitive processes, including inhibition (Lustig et al.,
2007), executive functions (Goh et al., 2012), episodic memory
(Shing et al., 2008), and reward learning (Mell et al., 2005).
These changes in cognitive abilities may in turn aﬀect economic
decision-making, such as the propensity to invest (Christelis
et al., 2010; Korniotis and Kumar, 2011).
Prior studies utilizing decision making tasks have suggested
alterations across a range of tasks, including the Iowa Gambling
Task (IGT; Denburg et al., 2005, 2009; Wood et al., 2005; Fein
et al., 2007; Zamarian et al., 2008; Baena et al., 2010; Carvalho
et al., 2012), the Gambling Task (Kovalchik et al., 2005), Balloon
Analogue Risk Task (BART; Henninger et al., 2010; Rolison et al.,
2012), and the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT; Deakin et al.,
2004; Henninger et al., 2010). However, it is unclear whether such
studies reﬂect speciﬁc alterations in economic decision making,
as these tasks feature outcome resolution at the end of each trial.
As aging has been found to impact reward learning (Mell et al.,
2005; Eppinger et al., 2011), it is unclear if the observed behavioral
changes are merely an extension of age-related decline in learning
or if they truly reﬂect altered preferences or strategies (see Mata
et al., 2011; Worthy et al., 2011). The former account is supported
by some (Henninger et al., 2010; Boyle et al., 2011) but not other
studies (Anderson et al., 2013).
Here, we examined how economic decision-making may be
speciﬁcally altered in relatively healthy OA, focusing on two
aspects of economic decision-making: uncertainty preferences
(risk and ambiguity) and choice strategies.
Uncertainty preferences are a measure of how an individ-
ual responds to the unknown future resolution of a probabilistic
option (i.e., a gamble). Uncertainty can be described as being of
two types, as risk when the probabilities of possible outcomes are
known or can be estimated, or as ambiguity when the proba-
bilities of possible outcomes are not well deﬁned (Knight, 1921;
Ellsberg, 1961; Camerer and Weber, 1992).
Uncertainty preferences diﬀer depending on whether indi-
viduals are facing potential gains or losses (Prospect Theory,
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Given the ubiquity of losses in
real-world decisions, it is important to understand how aging
may diﬀerentially impact decision making across both the gains
and losses domains. Across both the gains and losses domains,
prior behavioral studies investigating age-related modulation of
uncertainty preferences have resulted in inconsistent ﬁndings.
In the gains domain, while some studies found OA to be more
risk averse than younger adults (YA; Lauriola and Levin, 2001a;
Albert and Duﬀy, 2012; Mather et al., 2012; Tymula et al., 2013),
others did not show age-related eﬀects (Mikels and Reed, 2009;
Sproten et al., 2010). Inconsistencies have also been observed
in the losses domain with some studies suggesting that OA are
more risk averse (Mikels and Reed, 2009), and others suggest-
ing that they are more risk seeking (Lauriola and Levin, 2001a;
Mather et al., 2012). Only two studies have investigated age-
related alterations of ambiguity preferences, with one suggest-
ing that OA are less ambiguity averse than YA in the gains
domain (Sproten et al., 2010) and the other ﬁnding no alter-
ations (Tymula et al., 2013). Only one prior study has inves-
tigated age-related alteration of ambiguity preferences in the
losses domain, ﬁnding OA were slightly more risk averse than
YA. Neural evidence further suggests that we may anticipate an
asymmetry in age-related modulation across the gains and losses
domains. Samanez-Larkin et al. (2007) found reduced respon-
siveness in OA to anticipated monetary losses within striatal
regions, while showing similar modulations to YA in the gains
domain.
Beyond preferences, decision making is also dependent on the
strategy one employs to utilize available information to reach
their decision. For example, when choosing between two gamble
options, one can simply consider the probability of winning for
each option, or one can calculate and compare the expected
value of each. In a potentially related domain, previous studies
have reported that OA tend to use simpler and less demanding
strategies for decision making involving probabilities (Kim et al.,
2005; Rafaely et al., 2006). However, no prior study has investi-
gated age-related diﬀerences in strategy use in monetary decision
making.
In the present study, we examined how aging eﬀects uncer-
tainty preferences and choice strategies by contrasting relatively
healthy OA with YA. To evaluate age-related diﬀerences, partic-
ipants engaged in two incentive-compatible decision tasks (one
with gains and one with losses), from which we computed their
uncertainty preferences (risk and ambiguity) and quantiﬁed the
choice strategy they employed to reach their decisions. Our a
priori hypotheses were that: (1) healthy aging would result in no
alteration of uncertainty preference in the gains domain, (2) OA
would be less risk- and ambiguity-seeking in the losses domain,
and (3) OA would present diminished choice strategies across
both the gains and losses domains.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Data for the YA group were collected from 62 under-
graduate students studying at the National University of
Singapore (NUS; 24 males; age range = 19–26 years, age
mean ± SD = 21.90 ± 1.69 years). Data for the OA group
were collected from 39 cognitively healthy participants of the
Singapore Longitudinal Brain Aging Study (Chee et al., 2009).
These participants were screened, to exclude any of the follow-
ing: (1) history of signiﬁcant vascular events (i.e., myocardial
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infarction, stroke, or peripheral vascular disease), (2) history of
malignant neoplasia of any form, (3) history of cardiac, lung,
liver, or kidney failure, (4) active or inadequately treated thyroid
disease, (5) active neurological or psychiatric conditions, (6) a
history of head trauma with loss of consciousness, (7) a Mini-
Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975) score
<26, (8) a 15-point modiﬁed-Geriatric Depression Screening
Scale (GDS; Sheikh and Yesavage, 1986), or (9) a history of illicit
substance use.
All participants provided informed consent under a protocol
approved by the NUS Institutional Review Board.
Two OAwere excluded from analyses due to gross task perfor-
mance issues in the monetary decision tasks, resulting in a
ﬁnal sample of 37 OA (22 females; age range of 61–80 years,
mean ± SD = 68.66 ± 5.15 years). The demographics of the ﬁnal
sample of YA and OA participants are listed in Table 1. During
their sessions, participants also performed additional behavioral
tasks and surveys unrelated to this study.
Experimental Design
Data was collected as part of a larger-ongoing study. For the
measures included in this report, participants underwent multi-
ple measures of cognitive ability and performed two monetary
decision making tasks (the ﬁrst for the gains domain and the
second for the losses domain).
Measuring Cognitive Ability in OA
Cognitive ability in OA was evaluated across ﬁve domains: (1)
attention and working memory, (2) verbal memory, (3) visu-
ospatial memory, (4) executive functioning, and (5) process-
ing speed. Attention and working memory was assessed with
the Digit Span (Wechsler, 1997) and a computerized version
of a Spatial Span task. Verbal memory was evaluated using
Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT; Lezak et al.,
2004). Visuospatial memory was evaluated using a Visual Paired
Associate test. Executive functioning was evaluated using a
Categorical Verbal Fluency test (using categories of animals,
vegetables, and fruits), the Design Fluency test (Delis et al., 2001),
and the Trail Making Test (TMT) B (Reitan and Wolfson, 1985).
Processing speed was assessed with the TMT A (Reitan and
Wolfson, 1985) and the Symbol–Digit Modalities Test (SDMT;
Smith, 1991). To limit the number of comparisons, individual
TABLE 1 | Participant demographics.
Younger adults (YA) N = 62
Female, % 61.29
Age, years 22 ± 1.7
Older adults (OA) N = 37
Female, % 56.76
Age, years 69 ± 5.5
Education, years 12.1 ± 3.4
MMSE 28.1 ± 1.4
GDS 0.97 ± 1.38
MMSE, Mini mental state examination; GDS, Geriatric depression screening.
test scores were standardized (z-transformation) and combined
within each categorical domain. We examined whether these
cognitive domains are related to economic measures by corre-
lating the composite scores from each of the ﬁve cognitive
domains with our uncertainty preference and choice strategy
metrics. The signiﬁcance of these correlations was adjusted
using Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons with a
threshold of p < 0.01 (i.e., correcting for the ﬁve cognitive
domains).
Uncertainty Preference Tasks
Uncertainty preferences (risk and ambiguity) were gathered
through two monetary decision making tasks (see Figure 1), with
each task oriented toward either the gains or losses domains. All
participants performed the uncertainty-gains task followed by the
uncertainty-losses task. On each trial of each task, participants
chose between a certain option and a gamble option. Participants
were informed that reimbursement would be determined at the
end of the experiment based on random selection and resolution
of one trial from each task. No resolutions were provided before
the end of the entire experiment to eliminate alterations of
preferences and choice strategies due to inter-trial learning from
trial outcomes. Data collection and analyses were achieved using
MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) with Psychophysics
Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) for trial presentation.
The uncertainty-gains task (Stanton et al., 2011), consisted of
165 trials, in which the participant chose between a certain option
and a gamble option, which was either risky or ambiguous. For
both gamble types, losses always resulted in $0 outcome. For risky
gambles, there were ﬁve certain options ($3, $4, $5, $6, and $7),
three probabilities of winning (25, 50, and 75%) and the value
of the potential win ranged from $2 to $98, dependent upon the
ratio of the expected value of the gamble to the certain option
[relative expected value (rEV) or EVG/Vc] for that trial. The trial
matrix was constructed based on examining nine diﬀerent rEVs
(0.5, 1.0, 1.3, 1.6, 1.9, 2.2, 2.5, 3.0, and 3.5). With three prob-
abilities of winning and the ﬁve diﬀerent certain values, there
were 15 trials for each level of rEV. For ambiguous gambles, six
rEVs were examined (0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, and 6.0), calculated
using an assumed 50% probability of winning (by the law of large
numbers). This resulted in ﬁve trials at each rEV, given the ﬁve
values of the certain option.
The uncertainty-losses task consisted of 200 trials, closely
mirroring the uncertainty-gains task, save for shifting the valence
and adjusting the rEV values to allow for an anticipated
increase in risk-seeking preferences (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). There were ﬁve certain loss options (−$3, −$4, −$5,
−$6, and −$7) with 10 examined rEVs (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8,
1.0, 1.3, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0); this adjusted range resulted in
potential gamble losses ranging from −$0.4 to −$112. With
three probabilities of winning (25, 50, and 75%) and the ﬁve
diﬀerent certain values, there were 15 trials for each level of
rEV, as in the gains domain. These 10 rEV values were also
examined for ambiguous gambles, calculated using an assumed
50% probability of winning. This resulted in ﬁve ambigu-
ous trials at each rEV, given the ﬁve values of the certain
option.
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FIGURE 1 | Task timelines. Participants performed two monetary
decision-making tasks. One in the (A) gains domain (rewards) followed by a (B)
losses domain version. In each trial, participants were asked to choose between
a certain or a gamble option, with unconstrained response time. (C)
Participants’ payments were based on random selection and resolution of one
trial from each task, selected and resolved at the end of the entire experiment.
Quantifying Uncertainty Preferences
Within each task, we quantiﬁed risk and ambiguity preferences
by utilizing individual’s choice functions to ﬁnd the ratio of the
expected values of the gamble to the certain option at which
participants were indiﬀerent between the two. Each preference
value is an expression of the degree and direction in which the
participant’s choice behavior suggests they are modulating the
subjective expected value of the gamble due to the outcome being
unknown.
For each participant, four preference values were calculated
(risk and ambiguity for the gains and losses domains) through
psychometric indiﬀerence point analyses (Stanton et al., 2011).
For each, a choice function was constructed based on the
proportion of gamble options selected at each rEV. Examples
of choice functions for individual participants within the gains
domain are shown in Figure 2A and for the losses domains in
Figure 2B. The indiﬀerence point was deﬁned as the ﬁrst point at
which the projected choice function crossed 50%. We subtracted
1 from this indiﬀerence value to generate a ‘premium’ value. As
such, the premium measures the degree to which the participant
subjectively modiﬁes the absolute expected value of a gamble due
to outcome uncertainty. A zero premium reﬂects no change, a
FIGURE 2 | Example participant choice functions. (A) Gains domain, the
range of risk preferences across participants is represented from risk seeking
(left) to risk averse (right). The indifference point of each choice function is
shown with a red inverted-triangle. Risk premium is defined as the value on the
‘(EVG/Vc) − 1’ (x-axis) at this indifferent point. (B) Losses domain, the range of
risk preferences is represented from risk averse (left) to risk seeking (right).
(C) Relationship between premium metric and risk preference. Premium value
corresponds to the slope of the line. Note that, as the premium value modulates
the absolute expected value of the gamble, its relationship to preference (averse
or seeking) is inverted between the gains and losses domains – e.g., positive
premium values reflect risk-averse preferences in the gains domain and
risk-seeking in the losses domain.
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positive premium shows diminished valuation, and a negative
premium indicates enhanced valuation. These calculations were
performed separately for risk and ambiguity in each domain,
gains, and losses, resulting in four independent premium values.
On a technical note, our quantiﬁcation of uncertainty pref-
erences assumes a linear relationship between value and utility
across the range of possible outcomes (∼$100 in each task).While
non-linearities may be evident when dealing with much larger
sums (i.e., the diﬀerence in marginal utility for a dollar when you
have 50 or when you have 1 million), the required rate of dimin-
ishing marginal utility to produce non-negligible non-linearities
within a $100 range would result in highly untenable preferences
when dealing with any large economic choice (Rabin, 2000).
As the premium metric quantiﬁes the relative alteration of
the absolute expected value of the gamble, its relation to pref-
erence (aversion and seeking) is inverted over the gains and
losses domains (see Figure 2C). A positive premium in the gains
domain indicates diminished absolute valuation of the gamble,
which is also diminished valuation relative to the certain option.
In the losses domain the same positive premium value still indi-
cates diminished absolute valuation of the gamble, however,
this is a relative increase in valuation compared to the certain
option as the expected value of the gamble becomes less negative.
As such, the interpretation of premium values into preference
requires a reversal across domains (see Figure 2C). Therefore, in
the gains domain, positive premium values show aversion and
negative premium values indicate seeking, while in the losses
domain, positive premium values indicate seeking and negative
premium values indicate aversion. Neutrality corresponds to zero
premium values in both domains.
We note that in a prior study using the uncertainty-gains
task in a larger sample (N∼300, Stanton et al., 2011), we found
that our psychometric premium values were highly correlated
(correlations over | 0.6 |) with power function preference values
(Prelec, 1998). We note now, similar high correlations between
these measures of risk preference within the losses domain
[Risk losses r(93) = −0.71, p < 0.0001; Ambiguity losses
r(92) = −0.765, p < 0.0001]. For empirical reasons, due to
the speciﬁc design of this task, we prefer the psychometric
premium metric over the power-function measure [for a full
description of these reasons, please see Stanton et al. (2011),
Supplemental].
A small number of participants had choice functions that did
not cross the indiﬀerence point (50% acceptance of gamble),
preventing the psychometric determination of their premium
values. Our data cannot resolve whether such participants were
simply not performing the task correctly or if such partici-
pants had extreme preferences (we cannot diﬀerentiate between
a participant who employed a strict heuristic (such as ‘always
choose the certain/gamble option’) from one that considered the
options but always selected the certain/gamble option because
they are truly that averse/seeking to the gamble). This resulted
in the exclusion of variable numbers of participants across the
uncertainty metrics and domains (risk gains: 10 OA and 10 YA;
risk losses: 2 OA and 2 YA; ambiguity gains: 14 OA and 23
YA; and ambiguity losses: 1 OA and 3 YA). Importantly, there
were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the proportions of participants
excluded across the OA and YA for any cell [risk gains: χ2 (1,
N = 99) = 1.71, p = 0.19; risk losses: χ2 (1, N = 99) = 0.284,
p = 0.59; ambiguity gains: χ2 (1, N = 99) = 0.005, p = 0.94; and
ambiguity losses: χ2 (1, N = 99) = 0.27, p = 0.60].
Quantifying Choice Strategy
We examined whether aging altered what information partici-
pants relied upon to make their decisions through the use of
a choice strategy metric. For each participant, we performed
four independent linear regressions, two for each domain. Each
regression determined the inﬂuence of a speciﬁc informational
factor on choice in risk trials. We examined two factors: (1)
the rEV of the options, and (2) the probability of winning in
the gamble option (pWIN). Importantly, our task designs fully
orthogonalize the pWIN and rEV factors (i.e., in each task the
correlation of the values of pWIN and rEV across trials is zero).
The r2-value derived from each regression is a direct expres-
sion of the maximal amount of an individual’s choice vari-
ance (across trials) that can be accounted for by the examined
factor (for examples, see Figures 4A–D). We directly contrasted
utilization of these two competing trial-information sources by
subtracting the r-squares of the rEV and pWIN factors. This
results in our choice strategy metric (see Figures 4E–H), which
directly measures how much more each participants’ choice
behavior can be explained by the cognitively demanding calcu-
lation of the rEV of the options than by simple utilization of the
visually available probability of winning the gamble.
This choice strategy metric is positive when participants
utilize the rEV information more, negative when they focus
on the pWIN information, and zero when they use the two
equally. For example, a participant whose decisions were solely
based on the value of pWIN (e.g., accepting all gambles with a
75% chance of winning) would have a high pWIN r2-value, a
low rEV r2-value, and therefore a highly negative choice strat-
egy. Similarly, a participant whose choices were determined by
comparing the expected values of the gambles would have a high
r2-value for rEV and low pWIN, resulting in a positive choice
strategy value. Participants were considered to be ‘maximizing’
when they used the rEV information more and ‘satisﬁcing’ when
they used the pWIN information more, as focusing on pWIN
allows for decisions through extremely simple heuristics (‘how
much of the gamble pie is green?’) requiring little cognitive
eﬀort, while utilization of the rEV information maximizes long-
run outcomes but requires several layers of eﬀortful cognitive
calculation.
We note that we opted to focus on the rEV and pWIN factors
due to task design. While rEV and pWIN are orthogonal, other
trial factors do not share this feature. For example, in the gains
task the absolute value of the possible win is highly correlated to
both the rEV and pWIN factors [rEV: r(133)= 0.604, p< 0.0001;
pWIN: r(133)= −0.576, p< 0.0001], with similar correlations in
the losses task.
Relationship between Risk Preference and
Choice Strategy
As we found signiﬁcant age-related eﬀects for both uncer-
tainty preferences and choice strategies within the losses
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TABLE 2 | Cognitive measures in OA.
Cognitive domain Psychometric test Mean ± SD
Attention and working memory Digit Span forward 10.0 ± 2.3
Digit Span backward 7.2 ± 1.9
Spatial Span forward 7.5 ± 1.5
Spatial Span backward 6.9 ± 1.5
Processing speed SDMT (written) 44.6 ± 10.0
SDMT (oral) 51.0 ± 12.0
TMT A (s) 40.5 ± 14.0
Verbal memory RAVLT
Sums of trials 1–5 51.4 ± 7.5
Immediate recall list A 4.8 ± 1.6
Delayed recall list A 10.9 ± 2.4
Recognition list A 14.1 ± 1.9
Visuospatial memory Visual paired associates
Sums of trials 1–4 16.9 ± 5.8
Delayed recall 5.1 ± 2.0
Executive functioning Categorical fluency 43.2 ± 7.3
Design fluency 27.1 ± 7.5
TMT B (s) 92.2 ± 41.8
SDMT, Symbol digit modalities test; TMT, Trail making test; RAVLT, Rey auditory
verbal learning test.
domain, we looked for a possible interaction by examin-
ing the correlation between these metrics within each age
group.
Results
Cognitively Intact Older Sample
Our OA participants were cognitively unimpaired (MMSE≥ 26),
exhibiting psychometric test scores comparable to healthy partic-
ipants studied elsewhere (Table 2, comparing TMT A, SDMT
from Hsieh and Tori, 2007; TMTA and B from Tombaugh, 2003;
Digit Span from Hedden et al., 2002; RAVLT from Davis and
Klebe, 2001).
Relationship between Economic Measures
and Cognitive Ability in OA
To examine whether diﬀerences in cognitive ability within our
OA sample may alter economic preferences, we examined the
relationships between our economic metrics and cognitive abil-
ity within our OA sample. Cognitive ability was quantiﬁed
across ﬁve cognitive domains – attention and working memory,
verbal memory, visuospatial memory, executive functioning,
and processing speed (Table 3). To compare each of these
ﬁve domains to each economic metric, we set a Bonferroni
corrected signiﬁcance threshold of p < 0.01 (correcting for the
ﬁve examined cognitive domains), followed strictly as this was
an ancillary component of the study. No signiﬁcant correlations
were found between performance on these cognitive domains
and our uncertainty preferences (risk or ambiguity) or choice
strategies.
Effects of Aging on Risk and Ambiguity
Preferences
To examine whether aging alters risk and ambiguity preferences,
we contrasted our YA and OA samples, with comparisons listed
in Table 4 and shown in Figure 3. Within the gains domain, YA
and OA were similarly risk averse [mean± SD YA= 0.64 ± 0.66,
OA = 0.55 ± 0.61, between group diﬀerence t(77) < 1, p = n.s.].
Within the losses domain, we identiﬁed signiﬁcant age-related
diﬀerences, with YA risk seeking (mean ± SD = 0.22 ± 0.59)
and OA risk averse [mean ± SD = −0.17 ± 0.31, between group
diﬀerence t(93) = 3.662, p< 0.001].
A similar pattern of age-related eﬀects was also found
for ambiguity preferences (Table 4). In the gains domain,
participants in both age groups were equally ambiguity averse
[mean± SD YA= 1.54± 1.46, OA= 1.46± 1.04, between group
diﬀerence t(60) < 1, n.s.]. While in the losses domain, YA were
ambiguity seeking (mean ± SD = 0.24 ± 0.77) and OA were
ambiguity averse [mean ± SD = −0.19 ± 0.30; t(93) = 3.14,
p = 0.002]. Calculation of Cohen’s d indicated moderate to large
eﬀect sizes (Cohen, 1988) for age-related diﬀerences in both risk
and ambiguity preferences within the losses domain (Cohen’s d,
risk = 0.78, ambiguity = 0.66).
We found correlations between risk and ambiguity prefer-
ences within the gains domain [YA: r(35) = 0.34, p = 0.043;
OA: r(19) = 0.55, p = 0.009], concurring with a recent study
(Lauriola and Levin, 2001b). We extend this ﬁnding, showing
that risk and ambiguity preferences are also correlated within the
losses domain [YA: r(56) = 0.80, p < 0.0001; OA: r(33) = 0.68,
p< 0.0001].
Risk preferences across the gains and losses domains were
not signiﬁcantly correlated within either age group (all | r|
< 0.08, p= n.s.). Similarly, ambiguity preferences across domains
were uncorrelated in YA [r(35) = −0.11, p = n.s.]. However,
in OA there was a signiﬁcant negative correlation between
ambiguity preferences across the gains and losses domains
[r(20) = −0.46, p = 0.032]. Given the inverse relationship
between the premiummetric and preferences across domains (see
Quantifying Uncertainty Preferences), this negative correlation
shows a positive relationship in OA between ambiguity aversion
for gains and for losses.
A potential concern in interpreting the lack of found diﬀer-
ences for gains risk preferences between OA and YA could be that
highly risk averse participants were ‘cut-oﬀ’ by our task design
and analyses, which set a ceiling measurable risk premium value
of 2.5. This is extremely unlikely, as demonstrated by estimating
the likelihood of ﬁnding values outside of our measurable range,
based upon the observed risk premium values in the remainder
of each of our samples and the normal distribution. For YA, the
edge is 2.9 SDs from the mean, which indicates that approxi-
mately 99.5% of YA should have risk preference values within
our measureable range. Similarly, for OA the edge is 3.3 SDs
from the mean, indicating that approximately 99.9% of partic-
ipants should have measurable risk premium values. In other
words, based upon the means and variance of our participants
with viable risk preference values, we anticipate the presence of
fewer than one participant with preferences extreme enough to
not fall within our measureable range. We note that while an
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TABLE 3 | Relationships between decision making metrics and cognitive performance in OA.
Cognitive domain Gains Losses
Premium Strategy Premium Strategy
Attention and working memory r(25) = −0.03 p = 0.94 r(31) = 0.28 p = 0.12 r(33) = 0.43 p = 0.010 r(35) = 0.02 p = 0.89
Verbal memory r(25) = −0.10 p = 0.62 r(31) = −0.20 p = 0.27 r(33) = 0.08 p = 0.64 r(35) = −0.08 p = 0.63
Visuospatial memory r(25) = −0.06 p = 0.77 r(31) = 0.01 p = 0.95 r(33) = 0.29 p = 0.10 r(35) = −0.14 p = 0.40
Executive functioning r(25) = −0.01 p = 0.95 r(31) = 0.13 p = 0.47 r(33) = −0.18 p = 0.31 r(35) = 0.14 p = 0.41
Processing speed r(25) = −0.09 p = 0.65 r(31) = 0.18 p = 0.32 r(33) = 0.28 p = 0.11 r(35) = 0.22 p = 0.20
To account for multiple comparisons across the five cognitive domains, a Bonferroni corrected significance threshold of p < 0.01 was applied.
TABLE 4 | Comparison of economic measures between YA and OA.
YA
Mean ± SD
OA
Mean ± SD
YA vs. OA
p-value
Gains domain
Uncertainty premium
Risk
Ambiguity
Risk × Ambiguity
0.65 ± 0.66
1.54 ± 1.46
r(35) = 0.33,
p = 0.043
0.55 ± 0.61
1.46 ± 1.04
r(19) = 0.55,
p = 0.009
0.52
0.81
Information strategies
Choice strategy
r2 rEV
r2 pWIN
0.16 ± 0.24
0.26 ± 0.14
0.10 ± 0.12
0.12 ± 0.22
0.21 ± 0.16
0.09 ± 0.11
0.43
0.15
0.75
Response time (s)
Risk
Ambiguity
1.55 ± 0.61
1.35 ± 0.52
p = 0.046
2.49 ± 0.90
2.34 ± 0.83
p = 0.48
<0.0001
Losses domain
Uncertainty premium
Risk
Ambiguity
Risk × Ambiguity
0.22 ± 0.59
0.24 ± 0.78
r(56) = 0.77,
p < 0.0001
−0.17 ± 0.31
−0.18 ± 0.40
r(33) = 0.68,
p < 0.0001
<0.001
0.002
Information strategies
Choice strategy
r2 rEV
r2 pWIN
0.38 ± 0.15
0.40 ± 0.13
0.03 ± 0.04
0.31 ± 0.16
0.35 ± 0.13
0.04 ± 0.05
0.052
0.058
0.21
Response time (s)
Risk
Ambiguity
1.74 ± 0.51
1.69 ± 0.46
p = 0.57
3.17 ± 1.27
3.37 ± 1.25
p = 0.49
<0.0001
rEV, relative expected value; pWIN, probability of winning. Overall participants responded slower in the losses tasks than in the gains task with significant difference in OA
(p < 0.01) and marginally significant difference in YA (p = 0.068). Bolded values corresponds to statistically significant test at p < 0.05.
adaptive task design would avoid this potential concern by ﬁtting
trials to individuals, it would also produce additional concerns
such as trial order eﬀects.
Differences in Choice Strategy across the
Gains and Losses Domains
We examined whether aging altered what information partic-
ipants relied upon to make their decisions through the use
of our choice strategy metric. Choice strategy was determined,
within each domain, through linear regressions to determine
the maximal inﬂuence (expressed through r2-values) of the rEV
and pWIN trial-by-trial information on individual choice behav-
ior. These values were determined separately within each of
the gains and losses domains across our YA and OA samples
(Figures 4A–D).
Within both the YA and OA groups, we observed signiﬁ-
cantly higher choice strategies in the losses domain than in the
gains domain [YA: t(117) = 6.00, p < 0.0001; OA: t(68) = 4.23,
p < 0.0001] with large eﬀect sizes in both groups (d, YA = 1.10,
OA = 1.00; Table 4; Figures 4G,H). As the choice strategy metric
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FIGURE 3 | Risk preferences. Distribution of individual risk premium values for (A) younger adults (YA) in the gains domain, (B) YA in the losses domain, (C) older
adults (OA) in the gains domain, and (D) OA in the losses domain. The “∗” shows the mean of each distribution.
is a combination of two factors, we also examine the eﬀects of
aging on these factors individually, revealing that the diﬀerences
were driven by alterations to both components – increased use of
the rEV information [YA: t(60) = 8.45, p< 0.0001, d = 1.06; OA:
t(34) = 5.13, p < 0.0001, d = 0.94], along with decreased use of
the pWIN information [YA: t(56) = 4.62, p < 0.0001, d = 0.82;
OA: t(32) = 2.23, p = 0.033, d = 0.64]. A signiﬁcant correlation
between individual choice strategies across the gains and losses
domains was present for YA [r(55) = 0.42, p = 0.001], but absent
for OA [r(31) = 0.20, p = n.s.].
Effects of Aging on Choice Strategy
Examining for age-related diﬀerences in choice strategy, we
found no diﬀerences within the gains domain [mean ± SD
YA: 0.16 ± 0.24, OA: 0.12 ± 0.22, t(89) < 1, n.s.; Table 4;
Figures 4E,F].
Examining for age-related diﬀerences within the losses
domain, we found that OA exhibited lower choice strategies
than YA [mean ± SD YA: 0.38 ± 0.15, OA: 0.31 ± 0.16,
t(96) = 1.97, p = 0.052, d = 0.41; Figures 4G,H]. As
this change in the composite strategy metric could be
FIGURE 4 | Choice strategy – utilization of trial information. Relationship
of independent r2-values of relative expected value (rEV) and probability of
winning (pWIN) on trial-by-trial choice behavior for (A) YA in the gains
domain, (B) OA in the gains domain, (C) YA in the losses domain, and
(D) OA in the losses domain. Distributions of choice strategy metric
(difference between r-squares of rEV and pWIN) for (E) YA in the gains
domain, (F) OA in the gains domain, (G) YA in the losses domain, and
(H) OA in the losses domain. The “∗” shows the mean of each distribution.
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driven by either decreased use of rEV information or
enhanced use of pWIN information, we examined each
component individually. OA showed marginally signif-
icant lower use of rEV information [mean ± SD rEV
r2 values YA: 0.40 ± 0.13, OA: 0.35 ± 0.13, between
group diﬀerence t(97) = 1.92, p = 0.058, d = 0.40],
without alteration in the use of pWIN information
[mean ± SD pWIN r2 values YA: 0.03 ± 0.04, OA:
0.04 ± 0.04, between group diﬀerence t(96) = 1.27, p = 0.21,
d = 0.27].
Relationship between Risk Preference and
Choice Strategy within OA
Given the observed alterations of OA in both risk prefer-
ences and choice strategies within the losses domain, we
looked for interactions between these metrics (Figure 5).
We excluded one OA from this analysis, as her risk pref-
erence and choice strategy interaction was a strong outlier
(>4.95 SD). OA exhibited a highly signiﬁcant correla-
tion between risk preference and choice strategy in the
losses domain [r(32) = 0.77, p < 0.0001], such that the
closer their risk premium was to zero, the higher their
choice strategy. In other words, the greater their reliance
on the maximizing information, the more risk neutral
their risk preference was. This relationship was absent
in YA [r(57) = −0.11, p = n.s.]. Importantly, such a
relationship in OA is not due to our task design or
metrics, as evidenced by the absence of such a correlation
within YA.
FIGURE 5 | Interaction between risk preferences and choice strategies
in the losses domain. Within older adults, a positive correlation between risk
premium and choice strategy was identified, such that increasing use of the
rEV information (maximizing) results in more risk neutral preferences
(increased ‘rationality’). The included black line is the total least square line for
the older adults.
Discussion
We investigated the eﬀects of aging on economic decision-
making, focusing on alterations of risk preferences and choice
strategies within both the gains and losses domains, contrast-
ing cognitively healthy OA with YA. OA were signiﬁcantly more
risk and ambiguity averse in the losses domain, but were not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from YA within the gains domain. OA also
made signiﬁcantly less use of the maximizing choice strategy in
the losses domain. Finally, we found a correlation between risk
preference and choice strategy such that the more OA utilized
maximizing choice strategies, the more risk neutral (or ‘rational’)
their preferences.
Older Adults are More Risk Averse for
Losses
Older adults were signiﬁcantly more uncertainty averse in
the losses domain, but were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
YA within the gains domain. YA demonstrated the clas-
sic pattern of being risk averse for gains and risk seek-
ing for losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Contrastingly,
OA were risk averse across both the gains and losses
domains.
Given that OA have less time to recover from ﬁnancial
catastrophe, they are typically advised to shift their retire-
ment savings away from risky investments, (Jagannathan and
Kocherlakota, 1996). The preference diﬀerences we found
between YAs and OAs matches this advice. Our ﬁnding also
expands upon a study by Ebner et al. (2006), who found OA
to be generally oriented towards prevention of losses while
YA focused on pursuing gains. Our results suggest that such
a change can be extended to the domain of monetary deci-
sion making and could be the result of enhanced uncer-
tainty aversion for losses, rather than reduced responses to
gains.
It is unclear how such age-related alterations in economic risk
preferences may generalize to other domains, such as medical
or social decision making (Weber et al., 2002). In fact, while
risk aversion may be beneﬁcial in speciﬁc circumstances, an
overall increase in risk aversion would not be beneﬁcial in all
situations. Good decision making is derived from the ability to
tailor our preferences to the speciﬁc context and goals of the
choice.
We note that our risk preference metric, the risk premium,
is not the result of a speciﬁc theoretical model, but is simply a
zero-centered transform of the psychometric indiﬀerence point.
A potential pitfall of this empirical formulation of risk preference
is that it does not ascribe to any speciﬁc theoretical model of risk
preference, and therefore is not interpretable speciﬁcally in-line
with those models. However, a potential advantage of such a
model-free metric is that it does not rely on speciﬁc theoretical
assumptions. For example, expected-utility theory states that the
power function risk metric is the result of the diminishing weight
of marginal utility, but it is unclear if that is a viable mechanism
(Rabin, 2000). Similarly, Prospect Theory suggests that the risk
preferences of individuals should be highly correlated across
gains and losses (reﬂection eﬀect), but we ﬁnd no correlation
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between risk preferences across domains, concurring with other
empirical studies (Cohen et al., 1987; Schoemaker, 1990; Laury
and Holt, 2000; Tymula et al., 2013). We note, however, the very
strong correlations we ﬁnd between individual risk premium
and power function risk preference measures, indicating that
these measures do largely account for the same variance across
individuals.
Older Adults have Decreased Maximizing
Strategies within the Losses Domain
Within the gains domain, there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the choice strategies of YA and OA. However, within
the losses domain, OA showed lower choice strategies than YA,
speciﬁcally attributable to lower utilization of the calculated rEV
information while maintaining equivalent use of the readily avail-
able pWIN information as YA.
A possible explanation for why choice strategy was only
altered in the losses domain is that participants may have engaged
in more eﬀortful cognitive processing within the losses domain,
which may have helped reveal age-related diﬀerences. The pres-
ence of greater eﬀort is backed by the longer response times
in the losses domain (Table 4), signiﬁcant in OA and trending
in YA. Further, across both YA and OA, we see higher overall
choice strategy and speciﬁcally increased utilization of maximiz-
ing rEV (not just reduced pWIN), suggesting higher motivation
in the losses domain than in the gains domain. Such increases in
cognitive eﬀort for loss-related decision making concurs with the
standard concept of loss aversion, in which people weigh losses
more intensely than gains of the same magnitude (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). High levels of motivation and cognitive eﬀort
have been shown to help reveal age-related eﬀects in complex
tasks (McDowd and Craik, 1988; Huxhold O et al., 2006). It
may be that as aging reduces cognitive capacity, OA adapt by
conserving processing resources for highly motivated decisions
(Hess et al., 2009). Increased utilization of the maximizing strat-
egy in loss-related decision making may reﬂect OA consciously
choosing to engage inmore eﬀortful cognitive processing, but due
to limited cognitive resources, OA are unable to match the high
performance of YA.
Our ﬁnding, that OA made lower use of maximizing informa-
tion in the losses domain (i.e., lower overall choice strategy metric
and speciﬁcally decreased rEV), is consistent with prior studies
showing that older investors (age 60 and above) are less eﬀective
in applying their investment skills due to age-related cognitive
decline, even though they have greater investment knowledge
and experience than younger investors (Korniotis and Kumar,
2011), although other studies point out that reduced strategy may
not necessarily lead to diminished decision quality when simple
strategies are viable (Mata et al., 2012).
Correlation between Risk Preferences and
Choice Strategies in OA
Within the losses domain, the OA who utilized the maxi-
mizing rEV information, were more risk neutral. In classi-
cal economic utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944) rationality is characterized by utility maximization, which
translates into consistent use of risk preferences. Within our
sample of OA we see a correlation between preferences and
strategy, with maximizing strategy driving risk neutral pref-
erences. This pattern is intriguing for three reasons. Firstly,
consistent choice behavior is required for high values on the
choice strategy metric. As participants show consistent choices
over trials, their behavior can be considered more rational.
Secondly, OA, as a group, show convergence on a single pref-
erence value, driven by the degree to which they utilize the
eﬀortful strategy. In an individual, such consistent applica-
tion of preferences would result in consistent choice behav-
ior and enhanced rational choice. Thirdly, the speciﬁc risk
preference value that they converge on is risk neutrality, at
which utility maximization converges with value maximization.
This suggests that the more OA were motivated and engaged
in eﬀortful strategies, the more they focused on maximiz-
ing the objective value of their choices. In other words, this
speciﬁc linkage between risk preferences and strategy suggests
that OA are exhibiting a relationship between enhanced ratio-
nality and enhanced value maximization. Within YA, we see
greater variability in the relationship between risk preference and
strategy.
One possible explanation for these diﬀerences is that OA have
acquired experience over their lifetime about not just what infor-
mation to pay attention to (rEV vs. pWIN), but also how to
utilize that information. Consistent with our ﬁndings, a study
conducted by Tentori et al. (2001) observed that OA make more
‘rational’ choices (i.e., violations of transitivity while selecting
hypothetical supermarket discount cards) than YA, suggesting
that age-related accumulation of experience leads to greater ratio-
nal choice. Such wisdom gained through experiences would then
produce our found relationship, with higher motivated engage-
ment in the task (i.e., choice strategy) leading to more neutral
preferences.
An intriguing question is whether the eﬀects of aging on
economic decision-making are non-linear. Middle-aged adults
have been suggested to be better economic decision makers than
either YA or OA, at least borrowing at lower interest rates and
paying fewer fees (Argawal et al., 2007). Potentially, middle-
aged adults could have the highest quality decision making
as they have the beneﬁts of acquired life experience with-
out cognitive decline. In addition, further studies are needed
to understand how performance on lab-based economic tasks
translates to real-world economic behaviors (for example, see
Li et al., 2015).
Conclusion
Understanding the eﬀects of aging on uncertainty preferences
and choice strategies has vital implications for OA. Our study
investigated the eﬀects of aging on economic decision-making
across both the gains and losses domains, speciﬁcally examining
alterations in uncertainty preferences, choice strategies, and the
interactions of the two. We found clear diﬀerences in economic
decision-making between YA and OA in the losses domain, with
no alterations in the gains domain. Within the losses domain,
OA were more risk and ambiguity averse and made less use of
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maximizing choice strategies. Additionally, we identiﬁed a posi-
tive eﬀect of aging, a correlation between preference and strategy
such that the more engaged a participant was (higher choice strat-
egy), the more rational and value maximizing their behavior was.
Our results show that healthy aging results in both positive and
negative alterations of economic decision-making preferences
and strategies.
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